Alredy from the initial planning of the German offensive in the Ardennes in 1944, which was later to be known as the Battle of the Bulge, Hitler emphasized the importance of taking the bridges over the river Meuse before the Allied forces could destroy them. These bridges played a vital role in surrounding of Montgomerys 21st army group. The most essential part of the Ardennes offensive, known to the Germans as Wacht am Rhein, was the 'Rollbahn A-E', where the 1.SS-Panzer-Regiment (under SS-Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper) and 12.SS-Panzer-Division where to advance through the Losheim gap to the Meuse.
It was considered carefully what would be the best suggestion, and Hitler came up with the idea of equipping Panzer Grenadier battalions with American vehicles, weapons and clothing.
The commander considered most likely to be able to cary out this operation was SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, a favorite of Hitler, and famous for the operation wich set free Mussolini from the Hotel Gran Sazzo in Italy the year before, using only a handfull of paratroopers. He had just kidnapped the Hungarian Crown Prince, and subsequently captured the city of Budapest, when he was called to Rastenburg to meet with Hitler on 1944-10-22. After recieving the rank of SS-Obersturmbannführer, he was briefed about the situation. Otto Skorzeny later recalled that
He [Hitler] told me about the tremendous quantity of material which had been accumulated, and I recall that he stated we would have 6,000 artillery pieces in the Ardennes, and, in addition, the Luftwaffe would have about 2,000 planes, including many of the new jet planes. He then told me that I would lead a Panzer brigade which would be trained to reach the Meuse bridges and capture them intact.PALLUD, Jean-Paul, PARKER, David & VOLSTAD, Ron. Ardennes 1944 - Peiper & Skorzeny. Oxford : Osprey Publishing, 1987.
Although Skorzeny only had little more than a month to make this special-task formation, he started working immidiately. on 1944-10-26, se sent General Jodl the initial unit lay-out. He requested 3,300 men, divided into 3 battalions. Although Jodl must have know that to supply such a formation would have been impossible, Skorzeny was given permission to continue, and was promised full support.
Because of the low number of actual American equipment, German equipment was modified, or just painted green and given US stars, to resemble US vehicles. 5 Panthere and 5 Sturmgeschütze were "modified" with thin metal plates. The Panthers clearly were meant to resemble the M10, and the result was not all that bad. What the Sturmgeschütze were meant to look like is unknown - but they were green with stars. 1 Sherman (out of 2 captured) was in operational condition the night before the attack, but it came down with problems, and did therefore not take part of the action.
Beisdes the volunteer units, a few regular units were taken from the Heer, such as parachute battalions, 7.Panzer-Grenadier-Kompagnie and parts of 11.Panzer-Regiment. There were 500 Waffen-SS, 800 Luftwaffe and 1,200 Heer soldiers in the volunteer formation.
Because noone besides Skorzeny knew about the operation, there occured several rumors as to the purpose of the formation. Many of them were very optimistic (which could indicate that the soldiers were positive as to the future), but none of them were intirely accurate. These rumors were not put to rest, as the Allied intelligence would then be confused of the true purpose.
The prevent friendly fire, the Germans were to wear blue or pink scarfs, flash red or blue torches or (as for vehicles) display a yellow triangle on the rear of the tank (or drive with the gun pointing towards 9 o'clock). Furthermore, the unit was to paint white signs on the roads they used. This would certainly indicate to the Allies that something was up. Not only would it look suspecious that an entire unit of soldiers would wear similar scarfs - the ordinary army troops would also have to be told, which no doubt would have leaked to the Allies.
The best English-speaking volunteers were selected to a special commando unit, know as Einheit Stielau. They were taught in various forms of warfare, such as demolition and radio technique. They were also given instructions on how the US army looked like from within, and a few were sent to POW camps to refresh their English. This unit was be sent in in small units, and destroy fuel dumps, bridges ammunition, do reconaisance missions seep inside the Allied territory, and give out fake orers and spread confusion.
On 1944-12-14, Panzer-Brigade 150 reached its assembly area, and two days later, it moved out. The unit was attacking behing the forward units of the 1.SS-Pz.Div., 12.SS-Pz.Div. and 12.Volks-Grenadier-Division - the 3 leading formations. The unit, along with the rest of the offensive, was entangeled in the massive traffic jams that occured. Before having even moved into action, the leader of the first Kampfgruppe was killed by a mine.
After the I.SS-Panzer-Korps didn't arrive at the starting point until 2 days after the operation, and the Allies were aware of the operation, Skorzeny gave up the goals. He agreed with the 6.Panzer-Armee to use the unit as a regular battlegroup, and was given the task of securing the road junction of Malmédy, thus making the advance of the 1.SS-Pz.Div. and 12.SS-Pz.Div move again. What Skorzeny didn't know when planning this attack was, that what was thought to be only one engineer regiment holding Malmédy, was now more than a division.
On 1944-12-20, Panzer-Brigade 150 prepared to attack Malmédy. Because of the low strength of the unit, Skorzeny was hoping to be able to make a surprise attack. Unfortunately for Skorzeny, one of his men had been captured, and had revealed the battle plan. When Skorzeny attacked the day after, his Panzergrenadiers were met by heavy artillery, and therefore had to withdraw. Some of the Panthers set off a trip wire, and gave away their position. Although the Panzergrenadiers almost reached the US positions, they had to withdraw as darkness fell. Some Panthers and Panzergrenadiers managed to reach one of the US positions. Here, they were stopped by Private Francis Currey, who ran to help a bazooka gunner with new roackets (who then blew up a Panther), took the bazooka to fire at some of the Panzergrenadiers, managed to stop 3 Panthers with AT rifles, and then held back some more Panzergrenadiers long enough to allow a tank destroyer crew to escape. (an action for which he was later given the Congressional Medal of Honour).
The German forces slowly fell back, as they lost their Panther support - the only major battle by Panzer-Brigade 150 was over. On 1944-12-28, Panzer-Brigade 150 was relieved by the 18.Volks-Grenadier-Division. The unit withdrew and dissolved, the total casualties being 15 %.
It should be considered when referring to Panzer-Brigade 150, that it is comon practice to send out recon units wearing enemy uniforms. The use of disguised soldiers is not a feature limited to this one action. Many German soldier were also wearing the superior US clothes, thus making the unit seem larger as these were captured. Panzerbrigade was not a powerful unit, and once it was revealed to the Allies, most of the units were transferred to ordinary units for the duration of the campaign.
The accomplishments of the unit was not small, although most of this was indirect - the action itself was limited. The confusions caused by this unit in the US army was far strechting, and the Allies became very cautionous. Some captured soldiers from Panzer-Brigade 150 claimed that their mission was to capture Eisenhover and his staff, which of course upset the Allied intelligence. Post-war litterature exaggerates the Panzer-Brigade 150 to the extremes, as if it was a fighting unit with unlimited resources. Fact remain that it was underequipped, and in no condition to do the job it was assigned for. The unit did, however, decieve the US forces - 44 Germans managed to get through the US lines and back, losing only 8 soldiers. 2 even made a trip to the Meuse river and back in a jeep! On 1944-12-16, however, one unit already revealed itself, as it referred to itself as cavalrymen from the E company, while the US cavalry used the term troop in stead of company. This is an exellent example to prove, that even how careful preperations are made, certain thing can not be rehersed, and may remain unknown until it is to late.
The soldies of the units who were captured (a mere 18) were all executed as spies. Otto Skorzeny himself was not hung at the Nuremberg trials, but moved to Spain, from where he helped more than 500 nazis escape to South America.
Numbers in parantheses indicates multiple units or soldiers.
All contents written by Christian Ankerstjerne unless stated otherwise