The concept behind Panzers, as well as tanks altogether, should be found in World War I. The first tanks used prior to World War I were nothing but armoured cars (of which some were still in use during World War II), which were used as air defence.I
In 1915-02, Winston Churchill (by then First Lord of the Admiralty) witnessed an armoured Holt 75 tracked tractor in the role of an artillery tractor, together with other high-ranking officers. Previously, in 1914, Churchill had shown interest in such a vehicle. The demonstration was no success, but Churchill ignored the other spectators' views, and asked for the project to be developed further. The next experimental model was quite poor, and a third was therefore manufactured. This vehicle featured the rhomb-shaped sides. The British Army ordered 100 of these vehicles.II
There were some disagreements as to what role the tank should fulfil. Some believed that tanks should be used for them self, in concentrated attacksIII, whereas others believed they should act as infantry support in dispersed groups.IV
The first engagement of the tank was at Somme. Here, 40 British tanks attacked the German positins as infantry support. Even though they scared the Germans present at the battle, they did not manage to make the breakthrough that Haig was hoping for, and needed. This meant that the element of surprise was lost, just like J.F.C. Fuller had predictedV.
The, at the time, most prominent person in the field of tanks was J.F.C. Fuller (by then Major). He envisaged tank, not as a slow weapon meant for infantry support, but as a fast assault weaponVI. This was because of his past as a member of a light infantry regiment, which above all had speed as an asset.
It was Fuller who suggested a minor tank attack at Cambrai, to attack the head quarters of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria's, following a quick withdrawal. Before this could be initiated, Douglas Haig had started his attack at Ypres. It was not until after this blood bath that Haig began listening to Fuller, and authorized the plan for Cambrai. The plan, which started with a large breakthrough, ended as a failure.VII
During the war, Fuller presented his 1919 plan, which incorporated tanks 3-4 times as fast as those in existence at the timeVIII, and which could attack targets up to 100 miles behind enemy line.
Towards the end of the war, the central powers had a small number of tanks, ranging from small machine gun-carrying tanks to huge mobile fortresses. These tanks did not comprise the spine of German tactics; as the central powers did not possess the same resources as the Entete, they still had to rely on infantry.IX
This was done with the socalled Stoßdivisionen – attack divisions – which used light machine guns and morters, flame throwers, etc., to attack weak points in the enemy lines. These units comprised specially trained men who advanced with artillery and air support to take out enemy artillery.
One of the most decisive factors as regards the development of tanks after World War I was that the Entete and the central powers had very different impressions of the tanks. Where the Entete had experienced extreme losses (the British tank corps had just eight tanks left on November 5), the central powers were focusing on the large defeats they had suffered from the tanksX.
It was not surprising that the Entete would place less value on tanks in the time to come, whereas the central powers would be attempting to further develop what in their eyes would be the decisive weapon of the future.
Heinz Guderian is probably the most famous German strategist, and he was to have the most influence on the development of the concept of Blitzkrieg. During World War I he served with a telegraph battallion where he came to realize the importance of communications during warfare. He touched in on the cavalry as well, and later with the office for inspection of motorised transportation. Hence he had a solid understanding of the technical aspects as well as of the importance of motorisation.
He read, among other things, J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart's books and watched the operations of the British forcesXI. From these experiences he developed, with General Werner von Blomberg and others, his own tactics.
He was to publish these in the book "Achtung! Panzer!" which quickly became accepted by Hitler and the OKW – the books were to be viewed as more important in Germany than Fuller and Hart's books ever were in Great Britain. The reason was probably that Guderian's theories worked very well with the theories from World War I.
It was quickly evident that with the new Blitzkrieg, artillery would not be able to keep up, regardless of whether it was horse drawn or motorised. A replacement had to be found. Dive bombers became this replacement. Dive bombers could attack with great precision (as opposed to the British carpet bombers). At first the Blitzkrieg concept met with opposition from the artillery officers, but as it became evident that the concept was an addition to – not a replacement for – conventional artillery, this opposition dissipated.
The Versailles Treaty, which Germany was forced to sign to prevent occupation of her territories, dictated that Germany could have neither tanks nor an air force. Germany's armed forces could comprise only 100,000 men.
This was a setback for the production of planes and tanks both. Hitler had to wait quite some time before he could begin production, and even then some of the training of men had to take place in Russia which at the time was Germany's ally. Pz.Kpfw. I and Pz.Kpfw. II were dubbed "Groß Traktor" and "Leicher Traktor" – large and small tractor – to conceal their true nature.
Where the Luftwaffe, as essential to the Blitzkrieg as the Panzers, was concerned, aviation clubs were formed which were to train the pilots in air combat and offer important feedback to designers on the newest aviation theoriesXII. The civil war in Spain, where Germany's Kondor Legion fought for Franco, was important as well, as several problems of logistic nature were discovered at this time.
In the mid-thirties where production began, the Versailles Treaty had been pushed so much to the background that few were suspecting that Germany might truly be preparing for war.
The strategy of Blitzkrieg comprised a number of general phases. These have obviously varied from battle to battle, depending on which weapons were available, terrain, etc. Generally, however, the outlines were identical.
The weak points of the enemy were determined. This was done through larger assaults during up to several months in advance. It was important to find the places on the enemy front line which would be easiest to penetrate.XIII
Particularly during larger battles it provied difficult to conceal the concentration of troops necessary to attack and penetrate enemy lines. A German infantry division comprised roughly 17,000 men, more than 4,000 horses and motorised vehicles, and hundreds of cannonsXIV, as well as a Panzer division of up to 3,000 vehiclesXV and 14,000 men. The infantry division as well as the Panzer division moved slowly and would block roads and railways entirely.XVI
As a campaign easily might comprise 20-30 infantry divisions and some 5-10 Panzer divisions, it was an incredible logistical challenge to, not only move the forces, but also to do this without the enemy gaining knowledge of it, or attacking.
As it was of outmost importance that the attack came as a total surprise to the enemy, it was often required to fake an attack elsewhere on the front line (typically where the enemy would be expecting an attack) in order to draw forces away from the real target. This was done with air and ground forces both.XVII
The air attacks did not merely comprise bomber attacks such as those conducted by Ju87 and Ju88 bomber planes, but also paratroopers and airborne attacks. The faked attacks could thus also fulfill a goal of their own such as conquering key points and fortifications which otherwise might hinder advancement later on.
While enemy forces were occupied elsewhere the main forces were sent into battle. Whether a battle or a campaign would be succesful to a great extent depended on quick penetration now. As mentioned above, it all depended on finding the points on the enemy front which were most vulnerable.XVIII
As seen earlier, the Panzer was the primary assault weapon.XIX Panzers were used to break through the enemy lines, but once they had penetrated the front it was up to the infantry to actually fight down the enemy positions. The Panzers would advance with great speed, together with motorised infantry. Whenever a strong point was encountered, the Panzers would go around it, leaving it to the infantry to deal with.
Some Panzers were used to take out enemy tanks, while others (particularly the Pz.Kpfw. IV, with its mortar-like cannon) was deployed as mobile armored artillery. These were used to take out pillboxes and other fortified strong points where the smaller infantry cannons and mortarsXX were not always sufficient.
In spite of the predominant ideas that Germany's army mainly comprised the Panzers and the Luftwaffe, infantry was still one of the most important groups of the army. The infantry divisions obviously also played an important role in the Blitzkrieg. It was the infantry which would establish bridgeheads at rivers, etc., on which the Panzers depended, and it was the infantry that attacked cities as to prevent great Panzer losses.XXI
In order to fulfill all these requirements, the German infantry was armed with many different kinds of military gadgets. Not only did they have artillery, light and heavy machine guns and anti-tank cannons; they also utilized flame throwers (particularly useful against buildings and pillboxes) and explosives. Particularly the engineers used such equipment. These were deployed to lead the advance after the Panzer wedges to keep the flanks safe, for which reason they were often equipped with armored personnel carriers.XXII
The Luftwaffe was a very important factor in the Blitzkrieg, if not as important as it has often been credited for. Its primary function was to operate as advanced artillery and at the same time defend against enemy planes. In spite of Germany's possessing several good anti-aircraft cannonsXXIII, any column of vehicles was still very vulnerable to airborne attack. The dive bombers were not only artillery – they also operated as weapons of terror, and the sound of the incoming planes aloneXXIV was often enough to cause panic amongst enemy forces.
In order to take full advantage of the dive bombers it was imperative to have control of the air. To ensure this, enemy air strips were attacked, primarily with fighter planes and fighter bombers.
The British were the first to install radio in their tanks. The Germans quickly followed suit and built an advanced radio systemXXV. Lesser unit commanders could not ignore orders, and the German commanders could concentrate on commanding their tank (as opposed to the French commanders). All German aircrafts had radios, as opposed to many French aircrafts.
When conducting an attack with such great speed as Blitzkrieg required, there was a risk that the enemy forces might break through flanks or find a hole in German defenses. It was imperative to be able to fight down such an attack. This was done by having anti-tank cannons and infantry wait in positions along secondary roads so that they did not hold up the advance but were still able to strike with great speed. With these less important forces were also waiting recovery vehicles and army medic units.
Once enemy lines were penetrated, the Panzers and motorised forces were to attack quickly through enemy territory to ascertain a total breakdown of defense as well as to create panic and uncertainty among enemy troops.XXVI
Another core principle was the encirclement of the enemy in large groups where they could be slowly but determinedly destroyed. This princip was known as "Kesselschlach".XXVII
The primary factors of using the Blitzkrieg method was to find and isolate enemy weak points the same way that the Stoß divisions had during World War I. The enemy would be fooled into thinking that the main assault would come elsewhere, whereafter enemy weak points were attacked with great numbers of Panzers supported by the Luftwaffe. Infantry was to follow and destroy the enemy, still with air support.
Once a bridgehead was established more troops were sent in to strengthen the hold and take the attack far into enemy territory. Here, they would secure essential points and spread panic among the population so that the main forces could advance relatively easy. Once Panzers and infantry had advanced a good bit into enemy territory, it was time to encircle and destroy the enemy.
In the following we will go over the battles of Poland in 1939 (Fall Weiß) and France in 1940 (Fall Gelb) compared to the phases described in thre previous chaptor.
Fall Weiß began on September 1. The background for the operation was part that Hitler wanted Poland to return territories which had been German before World War I to Germany. Particularly Danzig through which Poland had access to the sea was of interest to HitlerXXVIII. Most of all, however, Hitler was intent on showing his army off to the world community. He used his demands to Poland to return Danzig to Germany to initiate the Polish campaign and at the same time tried not to involve France and Great Britain, at the time allies of PolandXXIX. It was furthermore important to the German war industry that the Polish industrial regions were taken relatively undamaged.
It should be noted that Germany in 1939 did not possess the well-trained army that many credit it with. Some units had received battle experience in Spain, but the majority of the infantry was still unbloodedXXX. They were to receive enough battle experience in Poland and France, however, to be the best trained army in Europe, possibly in the world, when Barbarossa took off on June 22, 1941.
Fall Weiß comprised five large attacks which were launched from Germany and East Prussia:
These units would create three geat pincher maneuvers which would serve to encircle the Polish army. It was planned that Russia was to attack Poland from behind which would ensure that Poland could not fall back and regroup and that the battle would not be drawn out.
Furthermore, several Gemans drove across the Polish border on August 31 under pretense of being tourists. These were to quickly take control of border controls so that there would be no resistance to the first advances.
In essence there was no faked attack on Poland – nothing intended to lead the enemy to the wrong place. Some Polish politicians did believe it possible that Germany "only" intended to close the gap between Germany and East Prussia, and thus a large part of the Polish army was stationed thereXXXII.
The assault more or less went according to plan for which reason there is no need to repeat the goals. Poland offered more resistance than expected in some places but the assault was at no time seriously threatened. The Germans did learn in Warzaw that their Panzers were very vulnerable which did lead to some losses.
Particularly the Luftwaffe played an important role as it could attack enemy points unhindered (after having annihilated the Polish air forces on the ground). 14. Armee made certain that no units could escape across the Vistula river which cut through Poland.
Contrary to plan, 10. Armee was ordered north to participate in the fighting in Warzaw. On the way they encircled a number of Polish units at Radom, slowing them down considerably. Parts of 8. Armee was re-routed to assist the 10. Armee.
The Poznan army which had been bypassed earlier sought to escape complete encirclement by attacking 8. ArmeeXXIII. The Poznan army did not make it out in time and the last units were encircled at Kutno. Guderian was permitted to drive his XIX Panzer Corps to Brest-Litovsk to, together with 3. Armee and 14. Armee, conquer the city. Guderian had a personal interest in this as his childhood home was close by.
Russia, which was supposed to assist Germany from the east, entered the war just as it appeared to be over. Russian accomplishments were thus limited but Russia did gain the part of Poland which had been agreed on earlier, including Brest-Litovsk which German forces had conqueredXXXIV.
After the pockets had been closed on September 17, the Polish army was slowly destroyed or captured. In spite of Poland's brave fighting effort they could not hold out against Germany's superior technical power.
Some of the Polish forces did manage to escape to France through Romania and Ukraine. Later they were evacuated to England.
As Great Britain and France were allies of Poland, they were forced to declare war on Germany at the invasion of Poland. On September 3, Great Britain and then France declared war on Germany. Neither nation was to attack Germany which Poland and Germany both had expectedXXXV. Both nations had, however, greatly overestimated the Allied forces at the French eastern front at the timeXXXVI.
It can be argued whether Fall Weiß was an example of Blitzkrieg as described in chapter 3. Speed was an important factor as was the Luftwaffe. On the other hand, the Panzers did not play an important role and the play between attack and defense during the Polish attack on the 8. Armee did not happen. The best example of quick penetration with Panzers is Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps, but this was not part of the original plan. The Polish army was not struck with panic the way that the French would be the year after. The large encirclements did resemble the Kesselschlacht theory.
The battle was chiefly an infantry affair – a motorised infantry battle, but an infantry battle nonetheless. A display of raw power which Germany won. The number of German tanks in 1939 was still so small that no great number of tanks were deployed at all.
If the weather had been different the results in Poland could have been different as wellXXXVII. It was fortunate for the German forces that the weather was relatively dry when the attack took place – if not, the entire German war machine could have been bogged down in the mud just as was to happen in Russia a few years later.
Fall Gelb which was to begin on May 10 was not just the battle for France, but also for Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg; Belgium and Holland were neutral at the time. France was viewed as undefeatable at the time, not just because its armies were considered the world's best but also because of the Maginot Line. This had been constructed in the light of Germany's succesful use of stationary defense compounds during World War IXXXVIII.
This defense perimeter did not protect France to the north which was the tactically most vulnerable regionXIL. For this reason France expected that an attack would come here, with the enemy going through Holland and Belgium. No one thought it possible to attack France through Luxembourg and the Ardennes Forest for which reason these areas were defended only by scattered second-rate divisionsXL.
At first the German plan resembled simply a repetition of World War I's plan for the attack on France, known as the Schleiffen planXLI.
The entire German army would attack across the entire front, from the middle of Holland to southern Luxembourg. Not a lot of people had confidence in this plan, not even the generals designing itXLII. General von Manstein, an at this time younger and less known general, reviewed the plan and realized that it would not succeed. He drew up his own plan to replace itXLIII. This was done on October 31, 1939. It took a while before the OKW agreed to show Hitler this new plan (three months), but once it happened, Hitler rejoiced.In all its simplicity, von Manstein's plan comprised Armeegruppe B faking an attack on Holland and Belgium. This would draw out BEF and the French army. Then Armeegruppe B would attack through the Ardennes and cut off BEF from the rest of France by a Panzer attack across France.
Here they would push the BEF up against the Canal whereafter they would be expected to surrender.
France, as well as Great Britain, used very different tank tactics from Germany's. Where Germany deployed their Panzers in concentration, France and England deployed their tanks spread out among the infantry, allowing the tanks to operate as infantry support. This meant that it was easy for the German forces to take out the few tanks used at a time and the otherwise superior Allied tanks comprised no real threat towards Germany's superior Blitzkrieg tactics.
As during the attack on Poland, Germany sent "tourists" across the borders to take border crossings etc. Paratroopers and airborne troops were deployed thus. The Belgian fortress Eben Email was attacked and conquered in just one day by airborne troopsXLIV as it overlooked one of the main attack lines. Rotterdam was attacked by paratroopers to control the Moerdijk bridge which would be used later. Later on, the 9. Panzer division and motorised infantry were sent in from the south towards Holland and Belgium, and several Panzer and infantry divisions were sent in from the north. These forces met only little resistance thanks t the previous attacks.
The German faked attack worked. The BEF and the French main forces moved north. Before they reached far they were, in spite of Belgium being under attack at the time being, stopped by the Belgian border guards. In essence, all noteworthy resistance had been removed from the main target.
Armeegruppe A, with three large Panzer corps, attacked the French positions through the Ardennes. As in Poland the attack went more or less according to plan, for which reason I will not repeat it here either. The German forces advanced quickly towards the Meuse river which was predicted to be the greatest hindrance they would meet.
Panzer Corps Reinhard made it fairly safely across the Meuse at Montherme as planned. At Sedan, however, the Germans ran into trouble. The German forces had to cross the Meuse, and this had to take place at Sedan. This was because Sedan was considered to be a weak point as the dividing line between the French 55. infantry division and 71. infantry division ran through there. Furthermore, the terrain made it possible to cross only at three bridges. Other logistic problems also helped slow the advanceXLV.
On May 9, Guderian began the bombardment of the pillboxes near Sedan with the Panzers and cannons available to him. The Luftwaffe assisted as well. The 55. infantry division saw the advancing German Panzers and called for artillery bombardment of them, however with reduced strengthXLVI.
With heavy casualties, German engineers made it across the Meuse and established a bridgehead. Particularly the infantry regiment Großdeutschland played an important part as they attacked with great strength in spite of heavy losses.
It was not until May 14 that Guderian saw his first Panzers across the MeuseXLVII. These in turn had to wait until a sufficient number of Panzers had crossed, for which reason the infantry was left to fight on its own.
While the French leaders were receiving word that the front was secured, Guderian chose to send his entire Panzer force west to make use of the success, rather than assist the infantry in defending the bridges against the French reserves.
Even if the Luftwaffe had destroyed several French and British fighter planes it turned out later that France could have scrambled planes against the German forces. There were hundreds of French planes which could have been used against the Germans. No less than 1,700 French planes in fighting conditions were discovered after the war. The reason turned out to be that French planes were removed from the danger zone – but as everything happened very quickly, no one knew where and how many. Because of this, an organised counter-attack was impossible.
After Sedan, Guderian's Panzer forces saw little resistance. They advanced unhindered until suddenly attacked on both flanks. On May 17-19, de Gaulle attacked the 10. and 1. Panzer division in the attempt to halt the German advance. This was the only French attack in 1940 which bore any resemblance to Blitzkrieg whatsoever and where tanks were used in concentration. As the French forces were pitifully equipped, the attack was fought off. It was close to breaking through the German lines, however.
Lord Gort – commander of the BEF – attacked from the north on May 21 in the attempt to penetrate the German forces. The lacking communication between the BEF in the north and the French forces in the south created so much confusion, however, that the attempt failedXLVIII. The 6. Panzer division attacked the BEF's left flank and routed the attack. This caused Hitler to show more caution later in the battle.
If the attacks on May 17-19 and 21 occurred simultaneously it is quite likely that the German Panzer units had been cut off from the infantry which at the time had trouble keeping up. If this had happened, the Panzer units would have been destroyed and France could have mustered a counter-attack.
Before Guderian's forces could reach the BEF and the French army, Hitler issued his famous "Halt" orders by which he stopped the entire Panzer force just outside Dunkirk. This allowed the BEF and a great part of the French army to escape. This is one of the most discussed decisions of World War II, and to describe it in detail would consume too much space.
In short, Hitler conferred with Hermann Göring and others, and then ordered Guderian's advance to stop, giving the Luftwaffe the honor of destroying the enemy forces. There are many suggestions as to why Hitler made this decision, including the theory that Hitler wished to leave the BEF and the French army intact in the light of future peace negotiations with Great BritainIL. On the other hand, Hitler was considering the conquest of EnglandL for which reason he probably would not wish to see its army escape.
The most logical explanation is that Hitler and the OKW simply did not understand that the enemy might escape across the Channel as Germany – unlike Great Britain – was not a seafaring nation to a great extentLI LII. As the British counterattack against Rommel had made Hitler more cautious he wanted to wait for the infantry to catch up. At Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe encountered real resistance for the first time for which reason their attack on the fleeing troops was less succesfull. As Dunkirk is geographically close to England, British fighter planes could attack across the Channel to attack the German bombers (which had no fighter protection) in France.
After Dunkirk, Germany concentrated on the rest of France. From the conquered part of France they pressed south. At the same time Spain attacked from the south and Italy from the west. On June 4, 1940, the Axis powers controlled roughly half of France. The rest of France capitulated and was placed under German control (known as Vichy France).
Finally, a short note concerning later battles. The Blitzkrieg tactic was never forgotten by the Germans and it was attempted used on several later occasions. Particularly during Barbarossa, Blitzkrieg was utilized in 1941 and 1942. The Germans managed to capture millions of Russians in this way, but due to limited space, we will not discuss Barbarossa here.
Besides, a discussion of Barbarossa would not add much to the factors of the use of Blitzkrieg discussed above.
Blitzkrieg was attempted used later, but at this time the Allies were too strong and Germany too weak for the Allies to be defeated in this fashion. Blitzkrieg was used in lesser scale through-out the entire war, with varying degrees of success.
It is evident that if Germany had not used Blitzkrieg, World War II would have ended like the first – a gigantic, static excercise in trench warfare. An important factor was that Poland and France did not possess these tactics – if they had, Germany would quite likely have lost in France.
Another important factor in the early success of Germany was that the German generals were fast learners, as opposed to their Allied counterparts. Besides the fact that the Allies were slow to learn the principles behind the Blitzkrieg and the design of tanks, they also fell for the same tricks several times. As an example of this can be pointed to the Ardennes in 1944. Here, Germany attacked through the Ardennes Forest exactly like in 1940, and the Allies were equally taken on the bed. The quick recovery of the Allied forces defeated Germany this time, however.
It should be pointed out that the first, decisive victories in a way caused Germany to lose the war. Hitler and the OKW only saw the victories of the Panzers and in their victory rejoicing forgot the infantry. This was a decisive factor in Germany's defeat later on.
It should be noted as well that the concept of Blitzkrieg has had a profounder impact on warfare after than during World War II. Today, practically every army and larger militia has tanks and armored vehicles which are used the exact way that Blitzkrieg dictates – quick and precise attacks where it will hurt the enemy most.
Generally speaking, Germany would have been facing a far greater challenge in Poland, and a victory in France would have been out of the question. Hence, Blitzkrieg has had a great impact, not only on the war itself but also on the world community in the years after.
Blitzkrieg origins from World War I. It was built as a theory based on experiences had by Germans and British both. It was the British tanks and the German Stoß divisions which created the tactic of swift, armored vehicles supported by infantry and dive bombers.
In all its simplicity, the tactic comprised finding the enemy's weak points, a faked attack elsewhere, whereafter infantry and Panzers – with air and artillery support – would break through at the weakest points. Panzer forces would then penetrate into enemy territory and create panic and chaos, ascertaining a quick surrender by the enemy. If required, enemy forces would be surrounded and destroyed by the infantry following in the Panzers' tracks.
In Poland, 1939, and particularly in France, 1940, Blitzkrieg tactics were deployed. In Poland this happened through two large pincher maneuvers which stretched through half the country to conquer Kutno, Warzaw, and Brest-Litovsk. This deployment bore some resemblance to the Kesselschlacht theory as well, for which reason it may be argued that this campaign was not really Blitzkrieg.In France, Bock's Armeegruppe B attacked Holland and Belgium which attracted the BEF. Then von Rundstedt's Armeegruppe A attacked through the Ardennes, and Guderian's Panzers pressed on until reaching the coast in the attempt to catch up with the French army and the BEF.
Blitzkrieg came to wield a great influence, not only on World War II but also on the years thereafter. Without it, Hitler would probably never have made it through France, and Barbarossa would never have happened at all.Blitzkrieg tactics are still used today, in modified forms, as the primary used tactic in larger campaigns.
All contents written by Christian Ankerstjerne unless stated otherwise